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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mind-body problem represents one of the most debated topics in the neurosciences. 
From a psychological standpoint, abstract/non-material data are an intrinsic part of the mind, 
intervening to a large extent in reasoning and decision making processes. Imaging studies 
also show a strong correlation between higher cognitive functions (such as working 
memory) and specific cerebral brain regions (a fronto-parietal network of interacting left and 
right brain areas). In contrast, the physical/material brain would be unable to interact with 
abstract-immaterial data, such that the psychological processing of abstract data (processes 
such as thinking, reasoning, and judgment) is attributed to the mind, with the mind 
representing a distinct entity interposed between the brain and abstract-immaterial data. 
Recent data suggest that the mind-body problem may simply be an artifact of human 
experience/ understanding, as the brain actually represents actually an intrinsic part of the 
mind. Even if the physical brain is not able to interact with abstract mental data, the brain 
still could process abstract data through a dynamic association between the abstract data and 
cerebral stimuli/ impulses. This form of processing without interaction defines the mind as a 
complex neurobiological structure, with the unconscious part of the mind processing 
abstract-immaterial data in a conscious/ mental format.  
In this overview, important concepts of psycho-physiologic emergentism, including 
internal mental reality, internal mental existence, internal mental interaction, and structural 
and informational dichotomies of the brain, are iterated. Such concepts/properties represent 
a neuro-informational support system capable of generating four distinct minds within the 
single brain. Future studies should further develop the dynamic and immaterial-material 
nature of the mind, as a possible premise for a scientific definition and understanding of 
mental events like affectivity, emotions, soul, etc.  
 
 
 
 
Acne conglobata is a rare, severe form of acne vulgaris characterized by the presence of comedones, 
papules, pustules, nodules and sometimes hematic or meliceric crusts, located on the face, trunk, neck, arms 
and buttocks.  
 
Case Report 
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Introduction 
The nature of the “mind” is still a poorly understood 
and highly debated topic, being defined more as the sum 
of psychological abilities/ faculties (consciousness, 
perception, thinking, judgment, memory) than as a 
unified concept/ entity (1). Beyond the abilities listed 
above, the mind appears much more complex, being 
able, for example, to engage in abstract capabilities such 
as imagination, appreciation, and processing emotions 
and feelings, which themselves may lead to attitudes and 
actions (2). Some psychologists consider that only 
rational ("superior") intellectual functions such as reason 
and memory comprise the mind, while emotions (love, 
joy, hate, fear), being more primitive, are to be 
distinguished from the mind (3, 4). Other authors posit 
that all rational and emotional (either conscious or 
unconscious) mental events should be viewed as parts of 
the mind (5).  
From a psycho-physiological perspective, the 
existing relationship between the mind and the brain 
(known as the mind–body problem) is far from being 
understood (6).  Thus, it is yet unknown how the abstract 
mind (abstract ideas or thoughts) functions within a 
physical brain, from whence it intervenes not only in the 
decision making process but also in the elaboration/ 
coordination of several motor responses, some of which 
are abstract in nature (e.g., abstract-based gestures). 
With these psycho-physiological processes yet 
unelaborated, the interrelationship and interdependence 
between the mind and the concrete (physical) brain 
evokes the debate regarding monism (7) vs. dualism (8). 
Dualism maintains that both the mind and the brain 
exist, each being independent of the other. Thus, the 
mind is considered either an independently existing 
substance (substance dualism), or a group of 
independent properties that emerge from the brain (and 
that cannot be reduced to the brain) (8).  
Monism, on the other hand, posits the  existence of 
only one component of the mind-body equation, either in 
the form of materialism (nothing exists apart from the 
material world, with mental phenomena being reducible 
to neuronal phenomena), or as idealism (only the mind 
exists, the physical objects and events being reducible to 
mental properties and events) (7).  
Recently a new conceptualization has been advanced 
as an alternative to monism and dualism, in the form of 
psycho-physiologic emergentism (9, 10). According to 
this new concept, the mind incorporates both abstract 
data and a neurobiological substrate.This new concept 
has gathered no critics thus far, perhaps due to the fact 
that its foundation draws from incontestable 
psychological and clinical events. Thus, on the one hand, 
the mind is psychologically able to receive and process 
abstract data, elaborating abstract responses (this being 
an incontestable event). On the other hand the mind’s 
function depends on the brain, with medical drugs 
capable of interfering with cerebral neurophysiology 
(general anesthetics, caffeine, etc.) and thus able to 
activate or suppress mental events (also an incontestable 
fact).To increase the credibility of the psycho-
physiologic emergentism approach, it is necessary not 
only to present its particularities, but also to explain the 
erroneous thinking behind the monistic and dualistic 
approaches. 
The erroneous approaches of monism and dualism 
begin from the observation that the material brain is 
unable to interact with abstract-immaterial data, the 
brain being therefore unable to process abstract data. As 
a consequence, monism tries to reduce immaterial data 
to material data, or vice versa. This approach is mistaken 
because abstract data (abstract concepts and information) 
not only exist separately from physical matter, but also, 
abstract data can participate to a great extent in our 
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decision making processes and physical actions. 
Dualism assumes that the mind and brain exist 
separately, the brain being unable to process abstract 
data which is processed by mind as a distinct entity. But 
this is a false perspective, because an incompatibility 
between the brain and abstract data would imply not 
only the incapacity of the brain to process abstract data, 
but also the incapacity of abstract data (like music, for 
example) to intervene/ act upon the brain in a manner 
that elicits coordinated/ abstract motor responses (such 
as might occur with dance).     
Psycho-physiologic emergentism maintains that 
there is actually no mind-body dilemma. There is in fact 
only a material brain capable of processing abstract data, 
through a dynamic association and without interaction 
between the physical brain and immaterial data (such 
dynamic association between the brain and abstract data 
composing together the mind) (11, 12). Two distinct 
observations need to be highlighted here.  
First, from the perspective of psycho-physiologic 
emergentism, a more fruitful approach is to examine and 
elucidate the existing affinity between the material brain 
and abstract data, as it makes less sense to try to 
investigate a possible relation between the entire mind 
(brain + abstract data) and a subcomponent of the mind 
(brain). Second, the part of the brain supporting mental 
processes is a complex structure (distinct and interrelated 
neuronal subunits), performing through emergentism a 
new mental/ psychophysiological function that is able to 
process abstract data and that is distinctive from classical 
neuro-physiological mechanisms (13). 
This paper presents the idea that the neurobiological 
support of mental events is represented by the brain, 
which could generate (due to structural and 
informational dichotomies) four distinct neuro-
informational patterns/ minds in a single body (14, 15). 
Discussion 
Internal mental reality and internal mental existence 
composing the mind 
External visual stimuli are represented by 
electromagnetic waves (that interact with cone cells of 
the eyes), external auditory stimuli are represented by air 
vibrations (that interact with the eardrum /ear), external 
gustative and olfactory stimuli are represented by 
chemical compounds (acids, bases, etc. interacting with 
lingual papillae/ olfactory epithelium), and so on. There 
are no colors, sounds, tastes and smells existing as part 
of the external medium. All these conscious stimuli exist 
only in our minds, and represent an internal projection of 
the external stimuli/ reality which is then reconstructed 
within the brain as a distinctive internal mental reality. 
Accordingly, the mind implies or “is aware” only 
through this internal (mental) reality, having no direct 
access to the external (physical, chemical) reality(12).  
Even without direct access to the external reality 
which is physical/ chemical in nature (in the form of 
acids, bases, etc.), we are, however, able to interact with 
the surrounding reality and, furthermore, to be conscious 
about it. This means that the conscious-surrounding 
reality is actually mental in nature, being represented by 
an internal mental reality/ stimuli (in the form of sour, 
bitter, colors, sounds, abstract representations, etc.). This 
internal mental reality therefore has the role of acting as 
the database surrounding (presenting information for) an 
internal mental existence (the “I” or the person 
him/herself) (16). This mental existence has 
intentionality towards the surrounding conscious/internal 
reality (through attentional focus and the decision 
making process), and autonomy from the physical body 
and reality. As an example, the internal mental existence 
has specific/ psychological needs and preoccupations 
(about social image and influence, political or cultural 
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activities, etc.), which often are more important than the 
physiological needs of the body. 
In parallel with environmental interaction—
between external stimuli and the body, there is an 
internal mental interaction—between the internal 
mental existence and the internal mental reality.  
Environmental interaction is ensured by the somatic 
nervous system (through the classical neuro-
physiological mechanisms), while internal mental 
interaction is a complex psychophysiological mechanism 
supported by both somatic and autonomic nervous 
systems (9) (Figure 1).  
Three important observations must be highlighted 
here, exemplified for the concrete mind. 
First, psychological experiences such as one’s 
internal mental existence and internal mental reality 
would have dedicated neurobiological structures 
(somatic nervous system supporting internal mental 
reality, and autonomic nervous systems supporting 
internal mental existence). The internal mental existence 
and internal mental reality represent the conscious 
domain of the mind, while the neurobiological (somatic/ 
autonomic) support would represent its unconscious part 
(that is, the mind is unaware of these processes). 
Second, these two distinct psycho-physiologic 
entities have synergistic action, with the internal 
somatic-reality being responsible for data exposure/ 
presentation and the internal autonomic-existence 
selecting (via attentional focus) the information/data to 
be analyzed/processed. From a psycho-physiological 
perspective, internal mental interaction would therefore 
occur between two distinct psycho-physiologic (neuro-
informational) entities, complementing one another and 
generating together (through emergentism) the mind (as 
an immaterial-material entity) (12). This means that the 
physical brain by itself would be unable to generate the 
mind (not having abstract data) through emergentism. 
Transmission of abstract data between these two neuro-
informational entities with no physical interaction is 
possible through the annexation of abstract data to the 
nervous/ physical stimuli, additional explanations of this 
psycho-physiologic mechanism of the mind being 
presented in a separate paper (12). 
Third, the psycho-physiological mechanisms 
ensuring internal mental interaction (between internal 
somatic-reality and internal autonomic-existence) are 
relatively similar to computer functioning, which is the 
basis of computational neurosciences (interaction 
 
Figure 1. Internal Mental Interaction, and External (physical/ chemical) Interaction 
Psycho-physiologic emergentism; four minds in a body  
89 
 
between distinct subunits) (5). These mental/ psycho-
physiological mechanisms are incompatible with the 
classical neuro-physiological mechanisms ensuring 
external interaction (between the body and the physical/ 
chemical environment). As a consequence, these two 
(psycho-physiological and physiological) mechanisms 
are connected only partially through the process of data 
transfer, which is possible through the conversion of 
information from a physiological format (specific to 
external interaction) to a mental format (specific to 
internal interaction). In some pathological situations 
(such as autism disorder), internal mental interaction is 
disconnected to a large extent from external interaction, 
with subjects living in their own (internal) world/ reality 
(17). On the other hand, the relative independence/ 
autonomy of internal mental interaction from external 
interaction/ stimuli leads to a relative subjectivism/ 
relativity of our mental appreciations and judgments 
(18). 
Abstract and concrete minds 
The process of data transfer from an external 
medium to the mind takes places through conversion of 
information from a physiological format (specific for 
primary sensory cortex) to a mental format (generated by 
secondary somatosensory cortex) (19). Somato-sensory 
cortex generates colors, sounds, tastes, smells, etc., (a 
mental/ conscious format of data), even though there are 
no `color pigments` in the brain. Such conscious/ mental 
impressions like blue, yellow, sour, etc. represent in fact 
the conscious form of data appreciation, namely an 
internal autonomic-existence recognizing mental data 
received from internal somatic-reality. This circuit 
belongs to the dorsal system of attention, with external 
information/ inputs being transmitted to the thalamus, to 
the somatic cortex of internal mental reality (to generate 
data in a mental format), and, further, to the autonomic 
cerebral system of the internal mental existence for 
recognition and processing. Efferent motor responses are 
ensured by the pyramidal motor system. These 
`concrete` afferents, cerebral centers and efferents 
together make up the concrete mind (20). 
Recent literature data suggest that the human brain is 
able to support not only the concrete mind, but also a 
dissimilar abstract mind (20, 21). This abstract mind 
could receive external information through a parallel/ 
ventral system of attention (the ventral hypothalamic 
input route), sending data first towards the autonomic 
nervous system of the brain (that generates the internal 
mental reality), and afterwards to the somatic nervous 
system of the brain (generating internal mental 
existence) (22).  
As a clinically-relevant example of the concrete 
mind, the dorsal system of attention first sends data to 
the internal mental reality of somatic nervous system, 
which then reconstructs the data into a mental sense/ 
format. From this point, the mental data are forwarded to 
the internal mental existence of the autonomic nervous 
system, which receives/ recognizes it (becomes aware 
about it). In addition to these mental messages from the 
surrounding/ internal mental reality, in an abnormal 
situation we (our concrete mind) can also receive 
aberrant stimuli from the ventral system of attention. 
Such signals cannot be recognized/ interpreted by us/ our 
internal mental existence as messages, as they bypass the 
internal mental reality and therefore lack a mental 
format. Aberrant (not mental) stimuli can reach either 
the parasympathetic or sympathetic components of the 
autonomic component of concrete mind, such that our 
mental existence experiences either an unexplainable 
(free-floating) anxiety (unjustified by mental data), or 
low mood and behavior/ aversion to activity in the form 
of depression (23, 24).  
Four minds in a body 
The dual functioning of the brain creates two 
opposing neural circuits (task positive network and 
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default mode network) supporting two distinct psycho-
physiological patterns (22). Thus, in generating the 
abstract and concrete minds, the brain functions in a 
dichotomous manner. But the human brain can also be 
characterized as having an anatomical dichotomy, in the 
form of right and left cerebral hemispheres/ hemibrains. 
Thus, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether the 
two (abstract and concrete) minds exist in both (left and 
right) hemibrains, being anatomically dichotomized and 
thereby generating four distinct psycho-physiological 
profiles (20, 21). 
 
This question could be clarified at least in part by 
understandingthe necessity of somatic-autonomic 
coordination within the brain. From a physiologic 
perspective, the anatomic distribution of the somatic 
nervous system ensures environmental interaction of the 
body, while the autonomic nervous system controls the 
functioning of internal organs. Sexual function would 
suppose a somatic-autonomic synergism within the 
brain, because it implies not only environmental 
interaction (with, for example, a sexual partner) but also 
autonomic organs and responses (testicles/ seminal 
vesicles, lubrication, vasodilatation for erection, 
tachycardia, etc.) that must communicate within the 
body (10).  
 
To avoid monopolization of somatic-environmental 
interaction by sexual processing (to make therefore 
possible both sexual and non-sexual environmental 
interactions, even if alternating), it would be necessary 
to decouple the autonomic nervous system from the 
somatic nervous system, or to decouple the entire 
(somatic-autonomic) brain from environmental 
interaction. Connection between autonomic nervous 
system and somatic nervous system is made via sexual 
pheromones for the abstract brain, and via sexual 
hormones for the concrete brain. Although this chemical 
connection is not voluntary, the human mind supposes a 
degree of control/ choice between sexual and non-sexual 
commitments (insofar as processing and responding). 
Accordingly, it has been suggested that the somatic-
autonomic complex of the brain is partly disconnected 
from external environmental interaction, in the form of 
an internal/ independent operator (the mind) that is 
capable of supporting both cognition (as an autonomic 
process) and sexuality (as a conscious event) (20, 21).  
Evidence from the literature suggests that sexual 
pheromones would activate the hypothalamic brain (left 
hemibrain for male pheromones, and right hemibrain for 
female pheromones), while sexual hormones activate the 
thalamic brain (androgens for left hemibrain, and 
estrogens for right hemibrain). There are thus four 
distinct psycho-sexual profiles described in humans, 
generated by the structural and informational 
dichotomies of the brain (11, 14, 15). But the cerebral 
(somatic-autonomic) operator is common for both 
cognition and sexuality, all sexual events being 
conscious (as libido and sexual arousal). This suggests 
that structural and informational dichotomies of the 
brain would actually generate four distinct minds, which 
act to coordinate both cognition and sexuality. 
Psychological peculiarities/ delineations between these 
four distinct minds will represent the topic of a 
forthcoming paper. 
 
Conclusions 
Abstract and concrete minds are different, from both 
physiologic-cerebral and informational-psychological 
perspectives. Accordingly, the effects of psychotropic 
drugs differ from person to person, such that some 
hypnotics have unexpected/ opposite-excitatory effects 
in certain individuals. In pathological situations like 
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persistent vegetative state, zopidem for example (a 
sedative drug used for trouble sleeping) has an 
unexpected arousing effect during the period of drug 
action. Such phenomena articulate the fact that not all 
persons/ minds are alike, some being even antagonistic/ 
opposite in their processing of information. The 
understanding of this psycho-physiological variation 
may represent a critical advance toward future medicine 
based on a more individualized psychology, psychiatry, 
and sexuality. 
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